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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue before us is a limited one. The appellant does 
not challenge the power of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service ("INS") to detain him. Indeed, 
appellant, a lawful permanent resident, concedes that the 
INS has legitimate grounds for detaining some individuals 
pending removal. The only issue is whether appellant, and 
aliens in his position, can be mandatorily detained pending 
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a final determination on removal without any opportunity 
for an individualized determination of the alien's risk of 
flight or danger to the community. Ironically, such a 
determination is provided for lawful permanent residents 
charged as alien terrorists, an accusation that has never 






Appellant Vinodbhai Bholidas Patel filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in which he 
challenged the constitutionality of his detention during the 
pendency of his deportation proceedings, detention 
mandated by the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") 
S 236(c), 8 U.S.C. S 1226(c) (2001). 1 The petition is directed 
to Charles W. Zemski, District Director for the Philadelphia 
District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Mary 
Ann Wyrsch, Acting Commissioner for the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and John Ashcroft, United States 
Attorney General, and claims that S 236(c) violates the 
alien's substantive and procedural due process rights under 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The District 
Court denied the petition and Patel appeals. Citizens and 
Immigrants for Equal Justice and the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association ("Amici") filed an amicus 
brief in support of Appellant. 
 
This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 since 
Patel seeks review of the District Court's final order in a 
habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. S 2241. Section 
236(e), which restricts judicial review of INS decisions made 
under this section, does not restrict judicial review of its 
constitutionality. Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 957 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (concluding that the restriction in S 236(e) "deals 
with challenges to operational decisions, rather than to the 
legislation establishing the framework for those decisions."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. To avoid confusion we will, when possible, use the statutory section 
number, i.e. S 236(c), rather than the codified section, 8 U.S.C. S 
1226(c). 
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We review de novo the District Court's legal conclusions 
regarding the constitutionality of the statute at issue. 
Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2001); 








Patel is a 55-year old native and citizen of India. He has 
lived in the United States since 1984 and has been a lawful 
permanent resident since 1990. Prior to his detention, Patel 
resided in St. Louis, Missouri where he has several 
business interests, including Dunkin' Donuts franchises, 
bagel shops, and hotels. Patel's wife and four children 
reside in the United States, along with several members of 
his extended family. In 1996, the INS approved Patel's 
application for naturalization. Prior to scheduling the 
administration of the oath of allegiance, the INS revoked its 
approval of Patel's naturalization request because of Patel's 
conviction of the crime that serves as the basis for his 
current removal proceedings. 
 
On January 10, 2000, Patel was convicted upon a plea of 
guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri of the offense of harboring an 
undocumented alien in violation of INA S 274(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 
U.S.C. S 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2001). Patel's conviction was 
based on his employment of the alien, and apparently his 
provision of a place for the alien to live. The undocumented 
alien had entered the United States several years prior to 
his employment by Patel. Patel had no involvement with the 
alien's entry into the country. The court sentenced Patel to 
five months of home probation and five months in prison at 
the Allenwood Federal Prison in Pennsylvania. App. at 4, 14.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the judgment of sentence does not include any reference to 
five months home probation, appellant recounted the sentence as such, 
both in his brief and in oral argument (without contradiction by the 
government) and the government's Response to the Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus in the District Court is in agreement. At argument, the 
government stated that it believed the home probation followed the 
prison sentence but there is some ambiguity in the record. 
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Although persons who are confined to a penal institution 
for 180 days or more cannot establish good moral 
character, a prerequisite to naturalization, INAS 101(f)(7), 8 
U.S.C. S 1101(f)(7), Patel has not lost his eligibility for 





On September 18, 2000, while Patel was serving his 
sentence, the INS issued a Notice to Appear directed to 
Patel charging that his conviction constituted an 
"aggravated felony" within the meaning of INA 
S 101(a)(43)(N), 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(N) (2001) and 
rendered him subject to removal under INA 
S 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2001). After 
Patel completed serving his sentence in January 2001, the 
INS took him into custody and placed him in detention in 
the Snyder County Prison in Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania. He 
remains there to the present day. 
 
On January 3, 2001, Patel exercised his right to request 
a bond hearing before an immigration judge ("IJ") to re- 
evaluate his custody status. The hearing was held on 
January 11, 2001. However, the statute provides that if the 
IJ finds that S 236(c) is applicable, the IJ is precluded from 
considering any factors for release. Thus, Patel was heard 
only on his argument that the crime of which he was 
convicted, harboring an alien, does not "relate to alien 
smuggling" and does not constitute an aggravated felony 
mandating detention under S 236(c). On January 12, 2000, 
the presiding IJ rejected Patel's argument. In so holding, 
the IJ followed the precedent of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals ("BIA") that a conviction for harboring aliens 
constitutes an aggravated felony. App. at 29-31. 
Consequently, the IJ found Patel subject to mandatory 
detention under S 236(c), precluding an individualized 
determination into the necessity of detention. App. at 29- 
31. Patel appealed this decision to the BIA and on May 15, 
2001, the BIA affirmed the decision upholding mandatory 
detention. App. at 32-33. 
 
On April 3, 2001, after a hearing on the merits of 
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removal, an IJ in York, Pennsylvania issued an oral 
decision ordering Patel removed from the United States. 
App. at 34. Patel timely filed a Notice of Appeal of this 
decision with the BIA and the order of removal has been 
stayed.3 
 
Patel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania contesting his detention under S 236(c). Patel 
v. Zemski, No. CIV. A. 01-405, 2001 WL 503431 (E.D. Pa. 
May 11, 2001). The District Court denied Patel's petition 








The current immigration laws reflect part of a growing 
effort by Congress to expedite the removal of criminal 
aliens. See S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 2 (1996) (describing goal 
of "expediting the removal of excludable and deportable 
aliens, especially criminal aliens"). Prior to 1988, all 
individuals subject to deportation were entitled to a bond 
hearing. See Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1976) 
(discussing the law as it existed at that time, INAS 242(a), 
8 U.S.C. S 1252(a) (1977)). Since that time, Congress has 
drafted several amendments to the immigration laws, 
gradually limiting the availability of discretionary relief for 
aggravated felons subject to deportation and increasing the 
categories of aggravated felonies,4 culminating in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Ordinarily, once there has been an order of removal, the section 
applicable would be INA S 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C.S 1231(a)(6) (2001), which 
governs post-final-order detention. The parties were uncertain whether 
the stay affected which provision applied, S 236(c) or S 241(a)(6). 
Because 
Patel remains in detention without any individualized review, we 
consider this case under S 236(c) as it was originally presented. 
 
4. In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
100-690, S 7343(a), 102 Stat. 4181 (1998), which amended former INA 
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passage on September 30, 1996 of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). Section 
236(c), codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1226(c), was added to the INA 
by the 1996 amendments, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and IIRIRA. It provides: 
 
       (c) Detention of criminal aliens 
 
       (1) Custody 
 
       The Attorney General shall take into custody any 
       alien who-- 
 
        (A) is inadmissible by reason of having commit ted 
       any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) [moral 
       turpitude and controlled substance-related offenses 
       with maximum penalties of at least one year] of this 
       title, 
 
        (B) is deportable by reason of having committe d 
       any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
       [multiple criminal convictions for crimes of moral 
       turpitude], (A)(iii) [aggravated felonies], (B) [controlled 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
S 242(a)(2) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C.S 1252(a)(2) (1989)), to provide 
"[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony upon completion of the alien's sentence for such 
conviction. Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Attorney General shall 
not release such felon from custody." 
 
In 1990, Congress amended INA S 242(a)(2) (formerly codified at 8 
U.S.C. S 1252(a) (1991)), by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-649, S 504, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990), to permit release of lawful 
permanent residents who demonstrated that they were not a threat to 
the community or posed a risk of flight. 
 
In 1991, former INA S 242(a)(2) was further amended by the 
Miscellaneous Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 
1991, Pub. L. 102-232, S 306(a)(4), 105 Stat. 1751 (1991), to allow 
release of "lawfully admitted alien[s] who had been convicted of an 
aggravated felony" if the alien "demonstrates to the satisfaction of the 
Attorney General that such alien is not a threat to the community and 
that the alien is likely to appear before any scheduled hearings." Former 
INA S 242(a)(2)(B) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1252(a) (1992)). 
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       substances], (C) [certain firearm offenses], or (D) 
       [miscellaneous crimes] of this title, 
 
        (C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) 
       [moral turpitude] of this title on the basis of an 
       offense for which the alien has been sentence [sic] to 
       a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or 
 
        (D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B ) 
       [terrorist activities] of this title or deportable under 
       section 1227(a)(4)(B) [terrorist activities] of this title, 
 
       when the alien is released, without regard to whether 
       the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or 
       probation, and without regard to whether the alien may 
       be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense. 
 
INS S 236, 8 U.S.C. S 1226. The language applicable here is 
S 236(c)(1)(B), applying mandatory detention to aliens 
convicted of aggravated felonies. 
 
The statute gives the Attorney General discretion to 
release an alien who falls under S 236(c) only if the alien's 
release is necessary to provide protection to, inter alia, a 
witness, a potential witness, or a person cooperating with a 
criminal investigation, and even then only if the alien will 
not pose a danger to the safety of others or flight risk. INA 
S 236(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. S 1226(c)(2). No discretion otherwise 
remains to consider whether criminal aliens, including 
those who were lawfully admitted to this country, pose any 
danger or flight risk during the pendency of the 
proceedings. 
 
Each detained alien is entitled to request a bond hearing 
at which an IJ determines whether S 236(c) applies. If it 
does, the hearing ends, as the statute precludes the IJ from 
inquiring into grounds for release or ordering release. In the 
case of non-criminal aliens, i.e., all other aliens subject to 
removal, the Attorney General retains discretion to decide 
whether they should be detained, released on bond, or 
released on conditional parole. INA S 236(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1226(a)-(b). 
 
Patel has been confined under mandatory detention 
without an individualized hearing under S 236(c)(1)(B), on 
the ground that the offense to which he pled guilty is an 
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aggravated felony. The term "aggravated felony" is defined 
in INA S 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43), and includes, in 
subsection N, 
 
       an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of 
       section 1324(a) of this title (relating to alien 
       smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for 
       which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien 
       committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, 
       abetting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or 
       parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision 
       of this chapter. 
 
INA S 101(a)(43)(N), 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(N). 
 
The referenced section, INA S 274(a), 8 U.S.C.S 1324(a) 
(2001), which serves as the basis for Patel's conviction, 
establishes criminal penalties for any person who brings in, 
transports, or harbors an alien. Patel argues that the 
words, "relating to alien smuggling" in INAS 101(a)(43)(N), 
were meant to be limiting, rather than descriptive, placing 
his conviction for alien harboring outside the reach of this 
statute. However, the IJ ruled against him on that issue in 
his bond redetermination hearing, citing to its earlier 
precedent in In re Ruiz-Romero, Interim Decision 3376, 
1999 BIA LEXIS 2, at *7-9 (BIA 1999), where the BIA held 
that those words are merely descriptive. In Patel's case, the 
IJ relied on Ruiz-Romero when he held that the 
parenthetical phrase evidences "[c]ongressional intent to 
criminalize all activities which enable[ ] aliens to enter or 
remain in the United States." App. at 30. Patel appealed 
this issue to the BIA and continues to assert that he is not 
subject to S 236(c) because alien harboring is not the 
equivalent of alien smuggling. This court does not have 
jurisdiction to decide the merits of Patel's arguments 
against removal, though the fact that he continues to 
challenge his removal through authorized channels is 




Patel claims that his detention without any opportunity 
for an individualized determination of his risk of flight or 
danger to the community violates both his substantive and 
 
                                9 
 
 
procedural due process rights to be free from restraint of 
liberty. Several district courts within this circuit have 
addressed this issue. The majority have found S 236(c) 
unconstitutional. See Sharma v. Ashcroft, 158 F. Supp. 2d 
519 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding mandatory detention under 
S 236(c) violates petitioners' due process rights and ordering 
INS to conduct a bond hearing); Radoncic v. Zemski, 121 F. 
Supp. 2d 814 (E.D. Pa 2000) (same); Koita et al. v. Reno, 
113 F. Supp. 2d 737 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding S 236(c) 
violates petitioners' substantive and procedural due process 
rights); Juarez-Vasquez v. Holmes, No. 00-CV-4727, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16417 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2000) (holding 
S 236(c)'s absolute restriction upon petitioner's liberty 
interest violates due process and ordering petitioner 
released unless the INS conducts a bond hearing); 
Chukwuezi v. Reno, No. 3: CV-99-2020, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15432 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2000) (same); Bouayad v. 
Holmes, 74 F. Supp. 2d 471 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same); but see 
Edwards v. Blackman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 1999) 
(relying on Seventh Circuit decision in Parra v. Perryman, 
172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999), to find no due process 
violation), vacated as moot, No. 99-3674 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 
2000). And of course, in this case as well the District Court 
held the statute constitutional, following Parra . 
 
In order to analyze the merits of Patel's claim, we must 
first establish the nature of the right asserted so that we 
can determine the standard of substantive due process 
scrutiny to be applied. Then we can assess the 
constitutionality of S 236(c) under that standard.5 Only if we 
find that S 236(c) does not violate Patel's substantive due 
process rights do we need to reach the question of 
procedural due process. 
 
"It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings." 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Although due 
process rights can be denied to aliens seeking admission to 
the United States, Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 
(1982), aliens who have entered the country are entitled to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Patel has framed his constitutional challenge as an as-applied 
challenge to the statute and we treat his challenge as such. 
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the protection of the Due Process Clause whether their 
presence in this country is lawful or not. See Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2501 (2001) ("[A]liens who have once 
passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled 
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards 
of fairness encompassed in due process of law.") (quoting 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
212 (1953)); Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 ("[O]nce an alien gains 
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties 
that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status 
changes accordingly."). Thus Patel, a lawful permanent 
resident,6 is entitled to due process protection against 
unlawful or arbitrary restraint, a legal proposition the 
government does not contest. Although the government 
accepts that legal proposition, it and Patel do not agree as 
to the appropriate level of substantive due process scrutiny. 
 
Patel argues that the statute deprives him of a 
fundamental liberty interest, which requires this court to 
apply heightened due process scrutiny. Specifically, he 
argues that government detention without an individualized 
determination infringes on his fundamental right to liberty 
and violates substantive due process unless the detention 
is ordered in "certain special and `narrow' non-punitive 
`circumstances,' " Appellant's Br. at 11 (citing Zadvydas, 
121 S.Ct. at 2499), and is not " `excessive in relation to' the 
purposes it is intended to serve." Appellant's Br. at 11 
(citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)). 
 
The government argues that the liberty interest of a 
criminal alien is not a fundamental right, relying on the 
decision in Parra where the court stated that the alien's 
chance of success in the removal proceedings is so minimal 
as to verge on the nonexistent. 172 F.3d at 958. The 
government argues that the alien's interest is the right to 
be free of "arbitrary" detention which is"subject to only 
limited judicial review" because an alien is entitled to a 
lesser due process right than a citizen. Appellee's Br. at 6 




6. The BIA has recognized that an alien maintains his or her status as 
a lawful permanent resident pending a final order of removal. See In re 
Mendoza-Sandino, Interim Dec. 3426, 2000 BIA LEXIS 3 (BIA 2000). 
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It is undisputed that Congress has plenary power to 
create substantive immigration law to which the judicial 
branch generally must defer. See, e.g. , Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589-90 (1952). As the 
Supreme Court has stated, "in the exercise of its broad 
power over immigration and naturalization, `Congress 
regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied 
to citizens.' " Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) 
(quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)). 
However, Congress' power is subject to constitutional 
limitations, including due process constraints. Zadvydas, 
121 S.Ct. at 2501. 
 
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in 
Zadvydas and distinguished between the deference that 
must be afforded to immigration policies and the more 
searching review of the procedures used to implement those 
policies. 121 S.Ct. at 2501-502. The issue in the present 
case implicates the latter, the means by which Congress 
effects its determinations regarding who should be deported 
and on what basis, not the actual criteria for deportation. 
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) ("The 
plenary authority of Congress over aliens . . . is not open to 
question, but what is challenged here is whether Congress 
has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of 
implementing that power."). This distinction was critical in 
Zadvydas where the Supreme Court reiterated Congress' 
right to remove and detain aliens but made clear that the 
Court did not infringe on Congress' plenary authority by 
addressing the constitutionality of the detention of aliens 
incapable of removal. 121 S.Ct. at 2501-02. We follow that 
path in examining whether S 236(c) infringes on a 
"fundamental" liberty interest. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 
(1993). If the statute infringes on a fundamental liberty 
interest, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest. Id. at 301-02. If not, there need only be a 
"reasonable fit" between the government's purpose and the 
means chosen to implement that purpose. Id. at 305. 
 
Patel does not contend that his interest is an absolute 
right to freedom during the pendency of his proceedings. He 
recognizes, as we noted at the outset, that the government 
has the right to remove aliens and to detain them during 
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the pendency of their removal proceedings. Id.  at 302; 
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 543 (1952). Patel asserts 
that mandatory detention nevertheless implicates his 
fundamental right to be free from physical restraint. The 
government, which describes the alien's interest as a 
conditional one, notes that this right to be free from 
restraint may be restricted to ensure his appearance at 
proceedings or to protect the community. Patel responds 
that the possibility of such restriction does not mean that 
the liberty interest infringed upon is any less fundamental. 
See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (upholding 
pretrial detention under certain circumstances despite 
infringing on the "individual's strong interest in liberty"). 
 
Several Supreme Court decisions guide our determination 
that the right implicated is a fundamental liberty right. In 
Flores, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality 
of detaining juvenile aliens pending deportation hearings 
pursuant to a statute that only allowed release to parents, 
close relatives, or legal guardians. 507 U.S. at 303. The 
Court applied a rational basis standard after finding that 
during the pendency of deportation proceedings the juvenile 
aliens had no fundamental liberty interest to be released 
into the custody of a private custodian rather than a 
government child-care institution, when no parent or legal 
guardian was available. Id. The Court based its decision to 
apply a rational basis test on the fact that children, by 
definition, are always in the custody of someone, whether 
their parents or the government, and the detention 
occurred in child-care institutions, not "barred cells." Id. at 
302. 
 
In contrast, the present case deals with a 55-year old 
man who has been locked in a prison cell for some eleven 
months. "Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at 
the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
from arbitrary governmental action." Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (finding that due process was 
violated by a Louisiana statute permitting continued 
confinement of insanity acquittee without an adequate 
hearing). "In our society liberty is the norm, and detention 
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. In Salerno, the 
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Supreme Court upheld the Bail Reform Act's authorization 
of pretrial detention on the basis of future dangerousness 
in criminal cases because several procedural safeguards 
were in place to protect the detainee's "fundamental" and 
"strong" interest in liberty: the circumstances under which 
detention could be sought were limited to the most serious 
of crimes, the arrestee was entitled to a prompt detention 
hearing, the maximum length of detention was limited, and 
detainees were housed apart from convicts. Id.  at 747-50. 
 
Most recently, in Zadvydas the Supreme Court 
recognized that immigration detention implicates a 
fundamental liberty interest. The Court examined the 
constitutionality of the detention of aliens who had received 
a final order of deportation but remained in INS custody 
pursuant to S 241(a)(6) because the government was unable 
to effect their removal to another country. The Court 
construed the statute to limit post-removal-order detention 
to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's 
removal, generally no more than six months. Zadvydas, 
121 S.Ct. at 2505. In reaching this decision, the Court 
stated that a "statute permitting indefinite detention of an 
alien would raise a serious constitutional problem." Id. at 
2498. It continued, "[f]reedom from imprisonment--from 
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 
restraint--lies at the heart of the liberty that[the Due 
Process] Clause protects." Id. The Court further asserted 
that "government detention violates that Clause unless the 
detention is ordered in . . . certain special and narrow non- 
punitive circumstances . . . where a special justification . . . 
outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected 
interest in avoiding physical restraint." Id.  at 2498-99 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 
Although aliens detained under S 236(c) are held for the 
finite period of time leading to the issuance of a final 
removal order and do not face the possibility of the 
unending detention that arises when the likelihood of 
executing a removal order is remote, as it was in Zadvydas, 
detention pending the issuance of a final order is often 
lengthy. Patel has been detained for eleven months, six 
months longer than his prison sentence for the underlying 
offense, and five months longer than the six-month period 
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the Supreme Court held presumptively reasonable for post- 
order detainees. Thus, while the Zadvydas Court did not 
address the constitutionality of pre-removal-order 
detention, there is no reason why the distinction between 
the statutes would make the Court's reasoning inapplicable 
to this case. 
 
This court has previously recognized the critical liberty 
interest implicated by immigration detention. In Chi Thon 
Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999), the alien had 
received a final order of exclusion but remained in United 
States detention for four years since his native country, 
Vietnam, would not accept him. In that case, as in this one, 
the power of the government to detain aliens was not 
challenged; rather, the case concerned the procedures 
necessary to effect that detention. Even though Ngo was an 
excludable alien, rather than a deportable alien, and 
excludable aliens traditionally have been afforded less 
constitutional protection than deportable aliens, see Mezei, 
345 U.S. at 212, we stated that "[w]hen detention is 
prolonged, special care must be exercised so that the 
confinement does not continue beyond the time when the 
original justifications for custody are no longer tenable." 
Ngo, 192 F.3d at 398. We recognized that "[m]easures must 
be taken to assess the risk of flight and danger to the 
community on a current basis," id., but noted the need to 
protect the alien's right to due process. We stated that the 
"stakes are high and we emphasize that grudging and 
perfunctory review is not enough to satisfy the due process 
right to liberty, even for aliens." Id. The decision of the 
Supreme Court in Zadvydas in effect validated our 
approach. 
 
Significant for our purposes here is our holding in Ngo 
that the "process due even to excludable aliens requires an 
opportunity for an evaluation of the individual's current 
threat to the community and his risk of flight." Id. We 
found that the statute satisfied due process because it 
provided for "searching periodic reviews" of the basis for 
detention but granted the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus 
since he had not received the "rigorous review of his 
eligibility for parole that due process requires." Id. at 399. 
Inasmuch as we insisted on heightened standards for an 
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alien ordered removed from this country, it follows that no 
lesser standard should be applied to a lawful permanent 





Because we have concluded that S 236(c) implicates 
Patel's fundamental right to be free from physical restraint, 
we must apply heightened due process scrutiny to 
determine if the statute's infringement on that right is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-02. As the Supreme Court held in 
Zadvydas, government detention violates substantive due 
process unless it is "ordered in . . . special and `narrow' 
non-punitive `circumstances' . . . where a special 
justification . . . outweighs the `individual's constitutionally 
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.' " 121 S.Ct. 
at 2499 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746; Foucha, 504 U.S. 
at 80; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)). 
 
In Salerno, the Supreme Court subjected the Bail Reform 
Act's authorization of pretrial detention in criminal cases to 
a two-part due process inquiry. 481 U.S. at 746-47. The 
test asks first, if the restriction on liberty constitutes 
impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, and 
second, whether the statute is excessive in relation to 
Congress' regulatory goals. Id. Applying the first prong of 
the Salerno inquiry to S 236(c), we readily conclude that the 
statute constitutes permissible regulation. The power to 
deport necessarily encompasses the power to detain. Thus, 
the detention mandated in S 236(c) is regulatory and not 
punitive. See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 537-38 ("Deportation is 
not a criminal proceeding and has never been held to be 
punishment . . . . Detention is necessarily a part of this 
deportation procedure."). 
 
In order to determine if the statute is excessive, the 
second prong of the inquiry, we must examine Congress' 
purposes for the statute. According to the Senate Report, 
Congress had found that (1) the number of aliens who 
commit crimes in this country has grown, (2) unacceptable 
delays hindered the INS' ability to detain and deport aliens, 
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and (3) criminal aliens posed a growing threat to public 
safety. S. Rep. No. 104-48, at 1-2 (1995). The statute was 
enacted with the goal of ensuring the immediate availability 
of criminal aliens for hearings and ultimately deportation, 
while protecting the public from the danger posed by 
criminal aliens. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 7349 (1996) 
(statement of Sen. Abraham) (mentioning mandatory 
detention as one of a system of reforms designed to 
expedite deportation of criminal aliens). Patel concedes that 
these goals present legitimate government objectives. The 
question before this court is whether mandatory detention 
absent any individualized inquiry is excessive in relation to 
these interests. 
 
Due process requires an adequate and proportionate 
justification for detention--a justification that cannot be 
established without an individualized inquiry into the 
reasons for detention. Ngo, 192 F.3d at 398-99. In Ngo, the 
challenge was to the denial of parole to an alien whose 
country of origin would not repatriate him. We held that 
"[d]ue process is not satisfied . . . by rubber-stamp denials 
[of parole] based on temporally distant offenses. The 
process due even to excludable aliens requires an 
opportunity for an evaluation of the individual's current 
threat to the community and his risk of flight." Id. at 398. 
We approved a system for evaluating detention that 
required the "searching [and] periodic" individualized review 
of the alien's eligibility for parole and that did not presume 
the need for continued detention based on criminal history. 
Id. at 399. 
 
In Flores, where the Supreme Court applied the rational 
basis test, the Court found that test was satisfied because 
the "detained juvenile aliens [were given] the right to a 
hearing before an immigration judge" regarding their 
custody. 507 U.S. at 309. In Salerno, where the Court 
upheld pretrial detention, such detention could be ordered 
only after the government had proved "by clear and 
convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified 
and articulable threat to an individual or the community." 
481 U.S. at 751. Even in Carlson, where the Court upheld 
the detention of aliens deportable based upon their 
membership in the Communist Party, the detention was the 
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result of a discretionary decision after an individualized 
determination that the individual posed a danger to the 
community. 342 U.S. at 538 (finding that "purpose to injure 
could not be imputed generally to all aliens subject to 
deportation" and thus required the exercise of discretion). 
In contrast to these statutes, S 236(c) has no provision for 
the kind of individualized hearing that was a predicate for 
detention in these cases. 
 
The requirements of substantive due process are not met 
unless there is a close nexus between the government's 
goals and the deprivation of the interest in question. In the 
context of S 236(c), there is no basis for us to conclude that 
the goals articulated by the government are sufficient to 
justify detention without individualized hearings. Section 
236(c) creates an irrebutable presumption that all aliens 
subject to removal under this statute present a flight risk 
or a danger to the community. The government's own 
statistics cast doubt on that presumption. The government 
cites a study, the conclusions of which Patel and the amici 
vigorously contest,7 finding that prior to the enactment of 
this statute ninety percent of criminal aliens not detained 
during proceedings fled. Appellee's Br. at 12 (citing Parra, 
172 F.3d at 956). In fact, a report from the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs placed the percentage 
of aliens who fail to surrender at twenty percent. S. Rep. 
No. 104-48, at 23 (1995) ("over 20 percent of non-detained 
criminal aliens do not appear for their deportation 
proceedings"). However, even if the ninety percent figure 
were correct, S 236(c) requires the imprisonment of the ten 
percent of aliens who would dutifully report to proceedings. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The study relied upon in Parra concerned the failure of aliens to 
surrender for deportation after final orders of deportation had been 
issued. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Inspection and 
Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct 
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10323 
(1997) (citing Office of the Inspector General, United States Dep't of 
Justice, Inspection Rep. No. I-96-03, Deportation of Aliens After Final 
Orders Have Been Issued 9 (1996) available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
oig/i9603/i9603.htm). While the incentive for aliens facing possible 
deportation to abscond is presumably high, we have no empirical data to 
provide an actual percentage. 
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To deprive these individuals of their fundamental right to 
freedom furthers no government goal, while generating a 
considerable cost to the government, the alien, and the 
alien's family. The goals articulated by the government--to 
prevent aliens from absconding or endangering the 
community--only justify detention of those individuals who 
present such a risk. 
 
Obviously, a hearing to evaluate flight risk and danger to 
the community presents a less restrictive means for the 
government to achieve its goals. It appears that such a 
procedure can be implemented with minimal burdens on 
the government. The government agreed at argument that 
shortly after an alien is placed in custody, the alien is 
entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to 
determine if s/he is an "aggravated felon" subject to 
S 236(c). There appears to be no insurmountable reason 
why this hearing could not be expanded to incorporate an 
evaluation of flight risk and danger, an evaluation that 
immigration judges already undertake for non criminal 
aliens.8 The requirement of an individualized hearing would 
infuse the detention process with the accuracy and 
precision that it currently lacks. 
 
We do not downplay the risk that some criminal aliens 
might pose to the community or the risk that they might 
flee before a final order is issued. But an immigration judge 
would retain the discretion to detain any alien who poses 
such a risk.9 
 
Patel's situation presents an illustration of the injustice 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The government argued that aliens would interpose delaying tactics 
that would complicate such hearings. However, control over the hearing 
and the ability to thwart such delays lies firmly in the hands of the 
immigration judge. 
 
9. Patel directs our attention to an INS-contracted study by the Vera 
Institute finding high success rates in a pilot program allowing for the 
supervised release of individuals in removal proceeding, including 
criminal aliens. See Eileen Sullivan et al., Testing Community Supervision 
for the INS: An Evaluation of the Appearance Assistance Program (2000) 
(finding that the vast majority of criminal aliens participating in the 
program appeared at all required hearings) at http://www.vera.org./ 
publication-pdf/aapfinal.pdf. 
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S 236(c) can present. The government has not suggested 
that Patel poses a flight risk or danger to the community. 
He is a lawful permanent resident who has resided in this 
country for the last seventeen years. He has significant 
business ties to his community, and his wife and four 
children reside in the United States. He was convicted of 
alien harboring, not a violent crime or a crime with 
attendant dangers such as drug use, and he was permitted 
to remain out of custody during his criminal trial. In fact, 
the sentencing judge divided Patel's sentence into five 
months of home probation and five months of 
imprisonment, further reflecting the absence of any risk of 
flight or danger. Despite these facts, under this statute 
Patel has been forced to spend the last eleven months in a 
prison in a town far from his family and business, with no 





The government suggests that we follow the decision in 
Parra, the only court of appeals decision to directly address 
this issue.10 The District Court here relied exclusively on 
Parra in denying Patel's habeas petition. Patel v. Zemski, 
No. CIV. A. 01-405, 2001 WL 503431 at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Eleventh Circuit, in Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338 (11th 
Cir. 1998), vacated by 526 U.S. 1142, remanded to 180 F.3d 1311 (11th 
Cir. 1999), upheld the constitutionality of S 236(c) in an isolated 
footnote 
amidst an examination of the constitutionality of the process 
surrounding bond requests for non-criminal aliens."Congress acts well 
within its plenary power in mandating detention of a criminal alien with 
an aggravated felony conviction facing removal proceedings [citing 
S236(c)] . . . This poses no constitutional issue . . . The Supreme Court 
has determined that bail need not be provided in all immigration cases." 
163 F.3d at 1363 n. 119 (citing Carlson, 342 U.S. at 546 for the last 
proposition). On remand from the Supreme Court, Richardson 
challenged the constitutionality of S 236(c) but the court found the 
statute inapplicable to his case and declined to rule on the matter, 
noting only that the sole circuit to address the issue, the Seventh 
Circuit, upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Richardson, 180 F.3d 
at 1317 n.9. Thus, the discussion in Richardson  does not provide any 
helpful analysis. 
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11, 2001). However, Parra was decided before Zadvydas, 
and thus the Seventh Circuit did not have the benefit of the 
Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutional concerns 
presented by mandatory detention of aliens. 
 
Parra, a citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident 
of the United States, was convicted of aggravated sexual 
assault, a felony that rendered him subject to removal from 
the United States. During the pendency of his removal 
proceedings, Parra was placed into federal detention 
pursuant to S 236(c). 172 F.3d at 955-56. The Seventh 
Circuit held that persons subject to S 236(c)"have forfeited 
any legal entitlement to remain in the United States and 
have little hope of clemency." Id. at 958 (emphasis in 
original). The court reasoned that because the possibility of 
discretionary relief from deportation under the statute has 
been restricted, deportation is "inevitable," and thus the 
legal right of the alien to remain in the United States has 
ended. Id. The court further held that because the alien 
lacks the right to remain and possesses the ability to end 
his detention by returning to his native country, the 
interest implicated is not substantial. The court found, 
under a procedural due process calculus, that the 
government interest outweighed the alien's limited private 
interest and the minimal probability of error. Id. 
 
We disagree with the holding in Parra. First, the Seventh 
Circuit attributed much of its decision to the deference 
owed to Congress' plenary power over the treatment of 
aliens. Id. at 958 ("Given the sweeping powers Congress 
possesses to prescribe the treatment of aliens . . . the 
constitutionality of [S 236(c)] is ordained.") (citation 
omitted). However, as noted above, the Supreme Court in 
Zadvydas made clear that Congress' authority over the 
means of implementing its policies is limited by the 
Constitution and need not be accorded deference. 121 S.Ct. 
at 2501. 
 
Second, the court in Parra assumed that all persons 
subject to S 236(c) will ultimately be given a final order of 
deportation, and concluded from this assumption that 
those persons have no liberty interest in being free from 
detention pending that final order. The amici have 
presented us with examples of instances where final orders 
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of deportation did not follow but we agree with the 
government that based on the strict requirements for 
deportation of criminal aliens and the limited availability of 
discretionary relief, a final order of deportation is likely in 
the majority of cases.11 However, the merits of the alien's 
removal proceedings should not be conflated with the 
determination of whether the alien should be detained 
pending the outcome of these proceedings. Although the 
Parra court did reason from one to the other, our precedent 
is to the contrary. In Ngo, we declined to collapse the issues 
of removal and detention, evidencing that whether or not 
the alien will ultimately be removed does not speak to the 
due process that must be afforded to the alien prior to a 
final decision on removal. 192 F.3d at 398 (finding that due 
process necessitates individualized review of detention for 
aliens who had already been ordered removed from the 
United States). 
 
In any event, Patel has a significantly more compelling 
case for an individualized hearing than the alien in Parra. 
Parra had been convicted of a violent sexual offense and 
conceded the unavailability of relief from removal. Patel, on 
the other hand, was convicted of a non-violent offense, 
retains the possibility of relief from deportation, and 
contests the classification of his offense as an aggravated 
felony, a challenge that could render removal improper. See 
supra p.9. Arguably, Parra is even inapplicable to aliens 
such as Patel who do not concede their deportability.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The possibility of relief from deportation is provided by statutory 
provisions for cancellation of removal, INA S 240A, 8 U.S.C. S 1229b, 
withholding of removal, INA S 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. S 1231(b)(3), asylum, 
INA S 208(a), 8 U.S.C. S 1158, voluntary departure, INA S 240B, 8 U.S.C. 
S 1229c, and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 
10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc., No. 100-20 (1988), as well as non-statutory 
options such as post-conviction relief or legitimate claims of 
citizenship. 
Aliens who have committed aggravated felonies are not eligible for some 
of these forms of relief. 
 
12. "[I]t is easy to imagine cases--for example, claims by persons 
detained under [S 236(c)] who say that they are citizens rather than 
aliens, who contend that they have not been convicted of one of the 
felonies that authorizes removal, or who are detained indefinitely 
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Nevertheless, we do not base our decision on such a narrow 
ground. 
 
Instead, we hold that mandatory detention of aliens after 
they have been found subject to removal but who have not 
yet been ordered removed because they are pursuing their 
administrative remedies violates their due process rights 
unless they have been afforded the opportunity for an 
individualized hearing at which they can show that they do 






For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the denial 
of Patel's petition for habeas corpus and remand with 
directions that Patel be released from custody unless the 
government makes a prompt individualized determination 
whether the continued detention of Patel is necessary to 
prevent risk of flight or danger to the community. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
because the nations of which they are citizens will not take them back-- 
in which resort to the Great Writ may be appropriate." Parra, 172 F.3d 
at 957 (discussing the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under 
U.S. Const. art. I, S 9, cl. 2, but finding that Parra presents none of 
those 
possibilities since he concedes that he is removable because of his 
criminal conviction and his home country would accept his return). 
 
13. Patel also alleges that S 236(c) violates his procedural due process 
rights. Because we conclude that Patel's substantive due process rights 
have been violated, it is unnecessary to determine whether his 
procedural due process rights were also violated. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 
746 ("When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or 
property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be 
implemented in a fair manner) (emphasis added) (citing Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
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